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Introduction
Marcia Prior-Miller (1989) has suggested that
four major social scientific perspectives con-
stitute the framework for most contemporary
organisational theory and research. She notes
that these are symbolic interactionism,
exchange theories, conflict theories, and
structural-functional theories. Prior-Miller
works from the premise that public relations is
an inherently organisational form of commu-
nication, “[b]y definition and by historical
precedent, the focus of the field is on the
relations that an organisation has with its
publics, whether those publics be internal,
external, or both” (p. 67). She goes on to
suggest that existing public relations theory is
either already built upon or can benefit from
engagement with these perspectives. 
Recent analyses of current directions
within public relations theory tend to bear out
this assumption. For instance Toth (1992)
contrasts the “systems” perspective with the
“rhetorical/critical” perspective. She notes
that the “systems” approach (e.g. Grunig and
Hunt, 1984) regards activities such as public
relations and corporate communications as
having the primary role of contributing to the
smooth functioning of the relationships
between an organisation and its publics and
ultimately to society as a whole, which tends
to locate the Grunig “systems” approach
within what Prior-Miller refers to as the
“structural-functional” perspective. Theorists
adopting the rhetorical/critical approach 
(e.g. Cheney and Dionisopoulos, 1989;
Miller, 1989) argue that all communication –
including public relations – is humankind’s
primary symbolic resource for exerting con-
trol over the environment, and this would
locate these approaches within the perspective
referred to, by Prior-Miller, as “conflict 
theory”. It could be argued, however, that
they have more in common than what divides
them. All of these approaches share similar
foundational presuppositions, so that, for
instance, they take for granted the existence of
individual subjects and organisational entities
with distinct boundaries. 
Referring to their book Public Relations
Theory (1989) Botan and Hazleton (Eds)
proclaim that “[t]he book seeks to identify
and explain the theoretic roots appropriate to
the study of public relations as a social sci-
ence” (p. 3). It is probably fair to say that
most theoretical accounts and studies of
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Abstract
This article offers an introduction to a theoretical approach
which has recently begun to be used by organisational
theorists to explain the distribution and exercise of power
between organisations and entities within particular
spheres, or “networks”. This approach, which has been
labelled “actor-network theory”, argues that focusing on
questions of “identity”, particularly questions of self-
identity, depends upon accepting and reproducing a
“modern” set of presuppositions. These modern presuppo-
sitions are concerned primarily with the creation of stable
boundaries and hierarchies, between subject and object,
and between self and other. Actor-network theory propos-
es that the notion of “agency” offers an alternative
“amodern” perspective from which to explore how
entities, or actors, influence other actors through the
process of translation. Concludes that actor-network
theory, as a meta-theoretical position and as a method-
ological approach offers an alternative to existing public
relations theory which cannot easily be ignored.
public relations practice have regarded the
social sciences as the most appropriate frame-
work within which to examine this area of
activity. Within organisational theory there
have, however, recently been calls for a re-
examination of the presuppositions which
inform this framework. Hardy and Clegg
(1996), for instance, suggest “[p]erhaps it is
time for both functionalists and critical theo-
rists to pause. Maybe the practical, ethically
situated and socially contexted uses of power
need thinking through?” (p. 636). This re-
examination has in fact been going on for
some time in various guises, one being the so-
called postmodern perspective, and attention
has been drawn to the fact that the social
sciences, like much contemporary Western
thinking, exist within what has been labelled
the “modern episteme”[1]. However, this
episteme (set of axioms) has not gone uncon-
tested and the second half of this paper will
consider an alternative which has been
described as “amodern” (Latour, 1993, p. 47).
However, the presuppositions which consti-
tute the “modern way of thinking” are so
deeply entrenched in Western thinking that
there is a tendency to take them for granted.
The next section, therefore, will endeavour to
highlight and contextualise the key assump-
tions which characterise the modern epis-
teme. 
“Modernity”, “identity”, and the
separation of humans and non-humans
Histories of Western philosophy invariably
locate the beginning of “modern” philosophy,
and indeed the beginning of a modern way of
thinking about the world and the human
beings relationship to it, with the work of
René Descartes. His aim in his two key philo-
sophical texts – Discourse on Method (1639)
and Meditations on the First Philosophy (1641)
– is to lay the foundation for a “scientific”
investigation of the physical universe, and in
these works he sets out a series of arguments
which attempt to pre-empt the sceptic’s claim
that certainty about anything, including the
existence and nature of the physical universe,
is impossible. One historically important
outcome of the set of arguments in the 
Discourse and the Meditations was the positing
of a world consisting of two different sorts of
entity. There is the external world, given to
me by a God, on whom I can rely, and which I
can scientifically investigate. But there is also
a me, observing the external world. Descartes
found he could doubt everything but the fact
that he must be thinking he was doubting –
Cogito ergo sum[2] – and this, said Descartes,
means that I must irreducibly be thought. I
can conceive of myself as existing without a
body, but I cannot conceive of myself as
existing without conscious awareness there-
fore the material which is my body is not part
of the quintessential me. This presumption
leads ultimately to a view of the world as split
between subjects, which are pure thought,
and objects, which are pure extension and
results in the bifurcation of “nature” between
mind and matter, observer and observed,
subject and object. This “Cartesian dualism”,
it has been argued, has become built into the
whole “Western” way of looking at the world,
particularly its science[3].
The same histories of philosophy tend also
to place Kant’s “Copernican revolution” at
the centre of the development of modern
thought. Kant held the view that our mind
shapes the way in which we perceive reality, so
that we cannot actually perceive anything
except through the concepts of space and time
and causation which our mind brings to it.
Kant argues that because all our perceptions
and experiences come to us through our
sensory and mental apparatus, they all come
to us in forms which are sense-dependent and
mind-dependent. Anything which falls out-
side those limits is simply not knowable by us.
Among his conclusions are that any experi-
enced world, perceived by experiencing sub-
jects, must appear to be ordered in the dimen-
sions of space and time, but that space and
time have no reality independently of this
ordering of appearances, and, therefore, no
reality independently of experience. The same
is true of the notion of cause, events in such a
world must appear to be causally interrelated,
but it makes no sense to speak of causal con-
nections existing independently of experi-
ence. In the Critique of Pure Reason (1933)
Kant states that objects must be thought of in
order to be known. Objects cannot be thought
except through the categories of thought, thus
objects cannot be known except through the
categories. According to Kant, human
thought has an irresistible impulse to unify
and give systematic arrangement to all human
experiences and cognitions. The “unity of
apperception”, which Kant also calls the “I
think”, is the ultimate condition of all experi-
ence and experience is always experience for a
7
Agency versus identity: actor-network theory meets public relations
Ian Somerville
Corporate Communications: An International Journal
Volume 4 · Number 1 · 1999 · 6–13
subject. The ego of the “I think” is a logical
requirement of all experience which Kant
describes as simply “a bare consciousness
which accompanies all concepts, ...a transcen-
dental subject of thoughts” (Kant, 1933, 
p. 404). “Known” objects are objects subject-
ed to the a priori categories of the human
understanding. In other words, we know
things as we are. This is Kant’s “Copernican
revolution” in philosophy: just as Copernicus
had created a revolution in astronomy, claim-
ing that the earth goes round the sun rather
than the sun round the earth, so Kant created
a revolution in philosophy, arguing that what
we see and think depends upon the nature of
our minds rather than the “objective reality”
of which we think we have knowledge. As
Warnock (1964) notes, Kant:
Insists upon a vital distinction between the
world as it is in itself and as it appears to us. What
exists, exists: its nature simply is what it is; with
that, we ourselves can have nothing to do. It is,
however, equally certain that what exists appears
to human beings in a particular way, and is by
them classified, interpreted, categorised and
described in a particular manner. ...Thus,
though our faculties and capacities make no
difference at all to the nature of what exists in
itself, they do partly determine the general form
that it has; for whatever the world may be in
itself, it appears to us in the way that it does
because we are what we are. It is, then with the
world as appearance that Kant is concerned; it
is objects as phenomena that must “conform to
our knowledge” (p. 300).
Kant regarded the objective datum, the
“world out there”, as a “pure diverse”, a
random inflow of scattered impressions lack-
ing all internal structure and intelligibility,
and capable only of being a source of determi-
nate knowledge. Kant focused his attention
on the universalising and “informing” struc-
tures of the knowing subject and in the
process of doing so he depreciated the objec-
tive datum. Thus, in the Kantian “reconstruc-
tion” of knowledge, the value and function
attributed to the objective datum is so
reduced that the weight of reconstruction
must be borne almost exclusively by the
activity of the knowing subject. The epistemo-
logical principles posited by Kant are the
principles of a critical idealism which lead
ultimately to a philosophy of subjectivism,
and which always involves, as a foundational
assumption, the concept of a boundary or
division between subject and object and
between the phenomenal and the noume-
nal[4].
This “modern” approach, evident in
Descartes, and emphasised by Kant, privi-
leges the subject and results in a position
which regards cognition as an activity which
posits, produces, or constructs its object,
rather than a submission to and an assimilat-
ing and affirming of the “real”. “Modernism”
is thus synonymous with the creation and
stabilisation of boundaries and with a preoc-
cupation with the notions of identity, in that, a
radical separation of the world into the
“human”, the “natural” and the “technical”,
leads ultimately to questions as to the essen-
tial nature, or identity, of each.
It could be argued that the modern epis-
teme has produced a lot of “good” and useful
things – for example, in art and science and
medicine and so on – and in general for many
humans, in Western industrialised society, it
has resulted in a better and more comfortable
life (Wise, 1997). Why then should anyone
wish to seek an alternative? Well, it could
equally be argued that, although the modern
episteme is associated with many good things,
it has some side-effects which, to say the least,
are problematic. So, for instance, dividing the
world up into self and other and creating strict
boundaries between subject and object, has
historically been to the detriment and even
the harm or destruction of the other or the
object. These “others” have tended to be
overrun and exploited as mere resources
whether they are humans, “natural objects”,
or other entities. The anthropocentric world-
view fostered by “modernity” places humans
centre stage and tends to marginalise and
exclude non-human entities, or at best treat
them as mere props on the set of a human
drama. As noted above, the modern episteme
has dominated Western thinking, but its
assumptions have, of course, not gone uncon-
tested. Most recent critiques of “modernity”
have emerged from the so-called postmodern
perspective, however, the next section will
discuss a perspective which labels itself
“amodern”[5].
Alternatives to the modern episteme:
the actor-network approach
Actor-network theory (ANT) proposes a
theoretical shift in emphasis away from the
centrality and primacy of the human subject.
Instead ANT regards the human subject as
simply another actor in a network. This theo-
retical shift has profound ontological and
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epistemological repercussions. In the modern
episteme it is taken as axiomatic that “reality”
depends upon the collective subjectivities of a
human community (its ontological axiom)
and that what we regard as “knowledge” is
constructed by a human community (its
epistemological axiom). It is exactly these
presuppositions central to Western sociology,
and indeed to most post-Kantian thinking,
which are questioned by actor-network theory.
A key feature of the actor-network
approach is its resistance to the modern reifi-
cation of boundaries which prevent us from
seeing the ways in which the “social”, the
“technical” and the “natural” are intermin-
gled in a seamless web. This position is admit-
tedly counterintuitive – for instance, we refer
both to machines and operators – but for
Latour (1993) these distinctions are not to be
taken for granted; rather they should be seen
as an achievement of the modern episteme –
he calls it the “modern constitution” (p. 13).
A useful analogy to explain this notion of the
seamless web is a cake mixture. In a cake
several different ingredients are mixed 
together – e.g. butter, flour, milk, eggs and
chocolate – until they become an homoge-
nous entity. It is possible to take a slice of cake
and “observe” the impact of one ingredient
but it seems absurd to arbitrarily ignore the
effect, or interconnectedness, of all the ingre-
dients. Latour (1993) notes that this predis-
position to classify, order, and in particular
dichotomise, is a key characteristic of the
“modern critical stance” which creates “two
entirely distinct ontological zones: that of
human beings on the one hand; that of non-
humans on the other” (p. 10) and establishes
“a partition between a natural world that has
always been there, a society with predictable
and stable interests and stakes, and a dis-
course that is independent of both reference
and society” (p. 11)[6].
So how might we redescribe the world from
an actor-network standpoint? Michael (1996)
has pointed out that there are three key theo-
retical premises which must be adhered to in
order to produce an actor-network account:
generalised agnosticism which requires an ana-
lytic impartiality as to whatever actors are
involved; generalised symmetry which involves
the use of an abstract and neutral vocabulary
to understand the conflicting viewpoints of
actors (i.e. the human and the non-human are
analysed with the same conceptual and termi-
nological framework); and free association
which demands the repudiation of a priori
distinctions between the social and the natural
and the technological. 
The approach emphasises the intercon-
nectedness of the heterogeneous elements
that make up a network and this interconnect-
edness is elucidated in the process of transla-
tion. This process has been described as piv-
otal in any analysis of how the different ele-
ments in an actor-network interact (Callon,
1986). Callon and Latour (1981) state:
By translation we understand all the negotia-
tions, intrigues, calculations, acts of persuasion
and violence thanks to which an actor or force
takes or causes to be conferred on itself authori-
ty to speak or act on behalf of another actor or
force. “Our interests are the same”, “do what I
want”, “you cannot succeed without going
through me” (p. 40).
Translation thus rests on the idea that actors
within networks will try to redefine the mean-
ing of other actors, “speak” on their behalf,
and enrol (manipulate or force) the other
actors into positions with them. When an
actor’s strategy is successful and it has organ-
ised other actors for its own benefit it can be
said to have translated them.
The actor-network perspective stresses
both the contingency of networks, that is, they
are not determined, permanent, or universal,
and what is referred to as their emergent quali-
ties. What this means is that networks are
rarely stable for long and are continually
bringing in new elements and changing the
relationships between actors. By focusing on
emergent qualities one avoids the requirement
to impose a theoretical framework upon the
network. The aim is to expose the work which
is being done in order to generate associa-
tions, to enrol and translate, rather than
appeal to some overarching, general analytical
construct that will do all the necessary
explaining (e.g. class, pathology, interests)
which are rooted in “taken-for-granted”
assumptions of the modern episteme and
which can themselves be “unravelled” in an
actor-network redescription (Michael, 1996,
p. 56). Rather the explanations should be
local, contingent, practical and reflect the
character of the specific work under study.
Such local explanations can only emerge in
the description, or narration, of the networks.
The actor-network approach assumes that
no actor is passive, all have some degree of
agency, but all of them vary in the extent to
which they influence or resist the influence of
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other entities (Callon, 1993). Not only are
humans and non-humans to be seen within
the same (conceptual and terminological)
framework, but micro-actors (individuals,
computers, etc.) and macro-actors (institu-
tions, corporations, governmental organisa-
tions, etc.) are to be seen in this way as well.
As Callon and Latour (1981) put it:
The difference between [micro- and macro-
actors] is brought about by power relations and
the constructions of networks that will elude
analysis if we assume a priori that macro-actors
are bigger than micro-actors...[A]ll actors are
isomorphic...[which] does not mean that all
actors have the same size but that a priori there is
no way to decide the size since it is the conse-
quence of a long struggle (p. 280).
Wise (1997) points out, in regard to episte-
mological positioning, any focus on social
actors is not based on notions of “identity”
but of “agency”. This is because what matters
to the analysis is not the self-consciousness or
“natural state” of the actor but, rather, its
relations with others actors. Latour (1993)
refers to one actor’s relationship with another
as alternatively the process of delegation or
“the pass” (as in passing a football, or handing
on the baton). Thus, the closing of a door is
delegated to an automatic groom (Latour,
1988) or the actions of yeast are passed to
scientists studying them, who then speak for
the yeast as its delegates (Latour, 1994).
According to Wise (1997, p. 33) this notion of
agency means that macro-actors cannot be
known to be more powerful than micro-actors
a priori, so, for instance, IBM (as a macro-
actor) cannot act on its own but only through
its delegates (be they human representatives
or its computers, etc.). The actor-network
theorist thus focuses on an actor not because
it is human, or because of its size, but because
it has the most significant role in a particular
network.
Actor-network theory and public
relations
To date there has been little comment on
actor-network theory from public relations
theorists although several writers from an
organisational studies perspective have
engaged with the approach. Writing on the
subject of metaphor and organisation Inns
and Jones (1996) suggest that, what they refer
to as, the “actor-network metaphor” has the
potential to radically alter our perspective on
organisations in many ways, particularly, of
course, in giving equal importance to human
and non-human elements in organisations.
They suggest that in theorising organisations
multiple interpretations are an asset rather
than a problem and that the deliberate use of
such metaphors in organisational research
“offers a way out of the cage of thought and
language constructed by the dominance of a
few paradigms within the subject” (p. 118).
Inns and Jones thus agree with Gergen (1992)
who stresses the need to challenge the “taken-
for-granted” in organisational life and with
Foucault who emphasised the importance of
trying to make “the familiar strange” thereby
achieving a new perspective. They point out
that the notion of organisations as actor-
networks challenges the traditionally accepted
belief that organisations are fixed in one place
as if an invisible boundary surrounded them.
Rather “[i]t changes our conception of an
organisation to incorporate all of the elements
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ which constitute the
organisation’s activity, and to see the taken-
for-granted boundaries established between
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ as an act of representa-
tion” (p. 118).
Similarly Gagliardi (1996) suggests that
Latour is right to point out that non-human
entities “are the missing masses who knock
insistently at the doors of sociology...[and]...
[t]o neglect to analyse them and observe only
human action is like limiting one’s gaze to half
of the court during a tennis match: the
observed movements seem to have no mean-
ing” (p. 568). He notes that in contemporary
organisations non-human entities perform
tasks that were previously performed by
human beings, not only that, “they condition
human beings, they interact with them and
are conditioned by them, in a chain of delega-
tion and transfers ... which have conscious
human beings at one extreme, efficient and
tenacious machines at the other, and the
power of signals and symbols halfway
between” (p. 568). Such interaction means,
for instance, that computers as “non-
humans” have now become such an intrinsic
part of organisational life that any “failure” on
the part of computers to play their allocated
“role” will be no less catastrophic to an organ-
isation than a human failing[7].
Latour and Callon’s concept of translation,
so central to actor-network accounts, has
been used in organisational theory to
redescribe the consultancy process. Clark and
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Salaman (1996) note that to be successful and
survive in the management consultancy
industry, consultants – and, it could be
argued, public relations practitioners – must
convince clients of their expertise, knowledge
and indispensability. To achieve this they
must appear authoritative, must behave confi-
dently and must be in command of something
which clients seek and value or which clients
can be persuaded to seek and value. Clark and 
Salaman suggest that it is “the apparent pos-
session by consultants of something that client
managers value which leads them to bestow
high status upon consultants. Therefore,
consultants’ authority vis-à-vis clients
depends on mastering techniques which
convey the impression that they possess author-
ity and expertise in areas which clients value”
(p. 175). It is suggested that they do this by
encouraging clients to make their judgements
about the value and quality of their service on
the basis of “generic symbols of expertise”
which they provide, such as qualifications,
quality of data, client base, demeanour, style,
confidence, and so on. 
Clark and Salaman argue that consultancy
success is achieved through “knowledge”
which is produced and displayed through
what Callon and Latour have described as a
process of translation. As noted above for
Callon translation is achieved through “prob-
lematisation” (Callon, 1986). So, according
to Clark and Salaman (1996), in regard to
management consultancy, “one actor (i.e. a
management consultant) convinces another
actor (i.e. a client) that their interests coincide
– ‘I want what you want’ – by redefining the
‘problem’ in terms of a solution owned or
within the orbit of the former” (p. 176). Thus,
organisations demanding expert assistance
from knowledge-intensive organisations, such
as management consultancies, cannot rely
upon assessing formal, rational bodies of
knowledge and expertise. Rather the “value”
attributed to a consultant and consequently
his or her ability to enrol and translate, is
dependent upon the belief that they are able
to offer something valuable to their clients.
As I noted above, there is little evidence of
any reference to the actor-network approach
in public relations theory. However, it might
be useful to attempt, to redescribe, from an
actor-network perspective, a network which
those writing within the modern episteme
would portray as a public relations struggle
between social actors. Examples of public
relations struggles between oil companies and
environmentalists have been utilised to illus-
trate certain points by those theorising public
relations (Cheney, 1992; L’Etang, 1996).
These descriptions discuss humans actors but
tend to ignore the non-human. From an
actor-network perspective the relevant actors
within the network includes: the sea; the
“public”; the oil company; the hazardous
waste; and the environmentalists. In actor-
network accounts it will be assumed that the
sea, or the hazardous waste, are important
actors possessing agency and sometimes
managing to place themselves at the centre of
the network.
Conclusion
Present public relations theory exists within
the modern episteme and reflects the ontolog-
ical and epistemological assumptions of
modernity. This means that those theorising
public relations tend to take for granted an
anthropocentrism which privileges the human
and the social in a dualism which marginalises
the non-human and the non-social. ANT
challenges this dichotomy in the sense that it
questions its hierarchical nature and argues
that a kind of heuristic flattening (Star, 1991)
offers a more coherent way of describing or
narrating a complex world filled with “quasi-
objects” – constructed from human and non-
human elements. The approach is beginning
to be used in organisational theory by those
theorists who question the “taken-for-granted”
“modern” presuppositions of the current
paradigms in the area. By exposing and dis-
puting modern assumption it may open up
the way to new perspectives in organisational
theory and it may do the same in public rela-
tions theory. However, it has not been the
purpose of this article to argue that public
relations should be viewed though the lens of
actor-network theory or that the modern
episteme should be replaced by the amodern
episteme. Rather the above discussion has
endeavoured merely to point to some features
of this perspective which the author believes
may be worthy of consideration by public
relations theorists. As has been noted, as a
meta-theoretical perspective the actor-net-
work approach resists and disputes a whole set
of presuppositions which inform most organi-
sational and public relations theories. It is also
clear that the approach has a significant
impact vis-à-vis methodology. So, for
instance, other actors which have previously
been ignored must be included in any 
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descriptions or explanations of organisational
scenarios and public relations struggles.
Notes
1 I have borrowed this term from Wise, 1997, p. xiv.
2 Walsh 1985 p. 224, has suggested that the Cartesian
formula Je pense, donc je suis or its Latin equivalent
Cogito ergo sum would be rendered more accurately
in English by the words “I am aware, hence (of course)
I exist”. In the very act of doubting I am aware of
myself as doubting and I am assured with certainty of
my existence as a conscious being being conscious of
my act. That is, I intuit the objective and necessary
connection between my being and my being aware.
Furthermore he notes that Descartes did not develop
this insight along the lines that “being conscious” is
necessarily a consciousness of being or of beings (of
one kind or another). Had he done so, his philosophy
would have developed into a philosophy of being (and
pre-empted Heidegger by four centuries). Instead
Descartes developed his insight in a rationalist and
idealist direction through focusing his interest merely
on the clarity and distinctness and certainty of his
foundational idea.
3 For a useful summary see Magee, 1987, p. 86. It is
worth noting that Descartes’ view contradicted both
Aristotle and Aquinas, in other words, classical and
medieval authority, who held that the knower has to
be understood as an essentially embodied creature,
and not just pure spirit. It is Descartes who is generally
credited with the construction of the “rational”
subject. See Couse Venn, 1984, p. 135 who notes “So
it is with Descartes that the theme of reason and a
Subject of-Reason most clearly emerges, [and] the
form of the argument in the Meditations (1641) and in
the propositions developed in the Discourse (1639)
together co-ordinate the key concepts of the modern
philosophical logos in their clearest critical form”.
4 On this point see Walsh, 1985, p. 322-23. For a more
extended discussion of Kant see Allison, 1983.
5 See Latour (1993), pp. 46-48, for a discussion of
distinctions between the modern and the postmodern
perspectives. 
6 Latour (1993) does point out that while the modern
episteme is characterised by purification and strict
boundaries between human and non-human entities
modernity itself is characterised by the proliferation of
nature/culture hybrids. 
7 A good example of this is the so-called “Millennium
Bug” which according to some predictions could
prove to be disastrous for organisational life.
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